Awesome intro, out with the old, in with the new
Runa Sandvik, look ma we are here
@runasand
- Tor and secure drop contributor
- Hacked a sniper rifle
- Works at NYT
- the industry was “PoC or GTFO”
- narrator: but she didn’t
- and that’s ok
- if you believe there’s a gap and a skill set, you can create your own niche, job, industry
- what are you up to?
Peter firman - automotive security
- grab slides
- some of those aren’t even protocols, they’re vulnerabilities with wire formats
- exciting and safe… not how you expect
- “trust” is more like “forced on you” in the IT industry
- faults and errors are OK, they happen and can be mitigated - they have to escape mitigations to be a problem
- Dependability is key
- fault mitigation in crypto - it either works or just burns and you don’t know where you are
- Timing predictions can be filed in “fiction”
- you can restart a 1996 Toyota ECU at 180kph and you only see an ignition ping miss
- Restarting every day is valid mitigation, try that with a web server
- US allows self cert, no one else does
- Outside the US, you can’t change it once it’s approved
- Tesla OTA brake updates were… fun?
- new design: Linux. Buy a train pass?
- software security in the presence of faults talk
- why would hackers care? Where’s the money?
- autobahn firmware updates? Oh nose
endpoint security selection
Missed this one
Courtney Elkhart - The mechanics of being good to each other
@hashoctothorpe
https://kawaiicon.org/talks/good-to-each-other
- hydrodemolition to resurface the bridge, high pressure water to strip it
- Too nasty to let drain into the lake
- You can’t store water in piles, the bridge is hollow
- … accessed by cutting holes into the pontoons
- During thanksgiving weekend
- typically Monitored so they aren’t over full
- Shit is more likely to break when you’re fucking with it
- expensive modelling and study found that pontoons don’t float while they’re full of water
- the bridge had cracks, the load twisted the pontoons, because they couldn’t keep up
- asking questions and documenting why is important, doubly so when it goes wrong, for the future
- if I couldn’t swear, I couldn’t run incidents
- Don’t swear at people or about the things they build
- millers law - assume it’s true and imagine what it could be true of, to understand another’s descriptions
- English is a pretty blame-y language
- Starting a sentence with “you” draws a line between you and the person
- Why is also blame-y
- always, never, every time, should just only - are bad
- why didn’t you just fix it last time
- so. Many. Assumptions.
- how, what, what if, (photo more)
- contributing factor analysis - find all the reasons, there’s rarely one
- human error is never a root cause, it’s a symptom
- enjoy your meeting
- Have an agenda
- Play nice
- Stay on topic and time
- don’t tune out - interactions and comments provide insight
- Try and get a different scribe or rotate, it takes a lot of analysis brain
- ensure everyone can speak, look for the shy/quiet
- wait. Wait more. Let people get their thoughts together
- Take humour out, it’s a bad time
- Some jokes are ok (photos)
- lighten the mood with kindness
- if you mess up, apologise and move on
- don’t be witty, no one wins a retro
- “please don’t make jokes like that here” and move on
- conways law is so true
- in 2019 we don’t need more reasons to push away allies
Gargoyle hunting: Detecting ‘Gargoyle’ code-hiding via automated Windows kernel analysis
- when threat hunters run out of time he gets the things
- Back in the day, viruses would write to disk
- then moved to memory
- gargoyle hides in non-executable memory
- only gets put into live memory periodically
- no executable code in itself
- Uses system methods
- ROP, stack pivot… blockchain
detection
- Super hard to get state, especially from userland
- volatility plugin! Timers dumps timers
- hunting automation should be objective. Don’t say x bad thing happened, but provide the observables
- unicorn-engine.org - emulates CPUs
- @alizthehax0r
- hilariously endearing
lunch announcement
Code brown : don’t interact with the sewerage
online voting - from bad idea to poor execution
Dr Chris Culnane, unimelb
Secrecy
Integrity
Verifiability
Availability
A is dominating the decision making process, because media exposure
Two method for voting and security, remote and supervised
internet voting lowers democratic equality, digital security takes money
Postal vote hacking takes a mass conspiracy
Internet, one bad actor can do it, possibly
coercion is an issue - household/carers etc is a problem
Pushes for the change
- claimed increase in turnout doesn’t actually play out
- “postal fraud” - incredibly unlikely
- “end of the postal system” - alongside the paperless toilet
- “cost savings” - massive upfront cost
Australian Internet voting, NSW and WA… owned by Scytl, no one knows who owns it and it’s kept super secret
PWC report about NSW voting system was super vague (photo)
WA voting went through incapsula, persistent cookie, shared certificate
Backend server was still open and located in NSW
partial / half completed votes were protected poorly and brute force able
“we trust incapsula” - WA and NZ…. awkward
2019 NSW, audit report was pretty damning
bad decisions
Expert advice is being ignored and they are being attacked on a personal level
Rookie mistakes
@chrisculnane
black swans: how to prepare for the unexpected
- @vashta_nerdrada
- Wade Winright
- thinks he’s DeadResourcePool man, looks like old man Logan
- 💩 ☂️
- threat model this: turkey, cat, dog
- challenge assumptions when threat modelling
- attackers have budgets and bosses
- expect the unexpected, kernel bugs, crypto fail etc
- black swan - originally impossible but a ditch guy found one in WA in the 16th century
- Black swan - only explainable after the fact
- silent evidence, the turkey’s lived for eleven months and life has been great
- A black swan only happens if you don’t know about it. Other people do - Snowden
- titanic captain never saw a ship in distress (quote photo)
- black swans are unknown unknowns. You can’t predict them.
- complexity++ == fragility++
- PaaS == RCE as a service
- turns out it was a Russian researcher, Postgres bug.
- need continuous assurance
- Spend your 85% well, then the other 15% is crazy town
- default in and out limit Comms
- validate you’re beliefs
- (photos)
- ephemeral all the things
- HSMs are better than not having them, because if you make it there, it’s already game over. Layers. Like ogres
- priv esc alerts
- Secret detection on checkin
- Feedback to engineers
- supply chain verification - libs, source, builds, CI/CD
- botb, pipeline test (photo)
- any sufficiently is sufficiently insecure until acted on by an outside force
- Fine grained permission
- per thread permissions
- Dropping capabilities is good
- Seccomp allows for removing system calls
- Kernel priv checks
- meet the engineers where they work, go to them.
- recap (photo)
- how often is CI/CD pipeline rebuilt?
APIC fail
Oliver ERNW
- ACI vulnerability assessment
- So. Many. Root. Processes.
vuln #1 - connect to management interface, see two ssh daemons
- second one is open on IPv6
- Key auth, one key for all systems, private and public keys are on every box
- firewall… which is open to source port
- locked down shell, but vulnerable
- path traversal :(
- allows file writing
cron takes file content and runs it
has filters but poorly, they used $()
he invoked the demo gods
worked great, root!
vuln 2 - APIC and Switch do discoverable interactions to talk to each other.
- no authentication.
- switch announces the required info
- photo - pops management open
- chain with previous one, get root
vuln 3 - LLDP
- custom LLDP types and subtypes
- buffer overflow, pop
- what is fgrep?
- 2-20 minute reboot time, if you miss on a brute force
- it’s noisy but you can do what you want
They’ve fixed some of these things but … attack surface is massive
(Not) hacking your biology
- Dr Sophia Frentz
- a genome is the first draft of a screen play of your life
- Maori people came out as Mexican 9/10 because of terrible data on small populations
- “how gay are you” on gene plaza
- identifying personal genomes by surname inference
- is it possible to provide meaningful informed consent about genetic data, because even the researchers don’t know what they’ll be able to infer
- https://www.mincingmockingbird.com/products/risk-postcards-set-of-12-troubled-birds
- German researchers pulled Australian medical data without much effort
- Social problems make technical issues worse - paperwork delays, people. People? People.
- security is hard but a culture is good
- Yaniv Erlich - shouting from the balconies about it
- Tell friends and family and harp on it
physical access control on Sesame Street
Matthew Daley
- system design
- I lost access to my slides, guess why
- Gallagher contolrollagher
- previously was called cardax
- Gallagher t20 - big boi
- the rest, long boi, wide boi
- Squiggle is the indicator
- Dave Dave Dave (photo)
- breathalyser module
- “i miss you, laptop”
- proxmark FTW
- https://proxmark.com/proxmark-3-hardware/proxmark-3-rdv4
- mifare has a shared secret
- “is that correct? … moving on”
- mifare card encryption details (photo)
- not difficult to infer
- mifare desfire is the current state of the art
- Cards have applications and keys and files, possible to have one card for everything
- “I won’t tell you the key or how to get it because I don’t want to be thrown in a room as a frazzle tester”
- epic brute force attack by replacing the reader, or putting a Bluetooth Arduino thing behind the reader
- long range readers can lower each other within … a short distance. A scary amount of power
- “bigger is better” (photo) antenna 3m range
- developed a method for identifying tech and non-default key
- 1/95 doesn’t use non-default key
- Laptop confiscated by the NZ police. Awkward
- Gallagher security health check, default thing
- hardening guides
- what is i2p?
- Tom Moore Moore info sec, his boss
securing people who don’t look like you
- Safestack.io
- Jessie Irwin has a gang of old ladies
- Rose is 78 and loves doing things on the Internet and she’s scary
- Standard advice couldn’t be applied because she’s… not us.
- old people, lol.
- should we let them be on the internet? Of course.
- age concern recipe for life (photo) - where do you find your things
- diagnostic frameworks for daily living (photo) - paper based frameworks for ascertaining daily life capability
- instrumental activities of digital living (photo)
- what do we mean by independent
- online assessment link (photo)
- power of Digital attorney
- socialise and improve plans
- referred back to purplecon y’all
- such a good summary of